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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMPACTS -- VALIDITY - REVIEW BY UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT - The states of Colorado and
New Mexico agreed by compact on a division of the water of the La Plata
river, which rises in the first state and flows into the second. The interstate
compact, as administered, required that during periods of low water the whole
flow of the river was to be used alternately by the states. For ten days Colorado
users were to have all the water, then for a like time to allow the water to
flow undiminished to New Mexico. In Colorado a ditch company engaged in
distributing water for irrigation had acquired by appropriation a right to a
certain quantity of water from the stream.1 The ditch company sued in the
Colorado state courts to enjoin interference with its right to the water. There
plaintiff succeeded; the supreme court held the compact ineffective to impair
private vested rights. 2 On appeal to the United States ~upreme Court, held, the

1 Under the appropriation doctrine of water rights in force in many western
states, the first person to put water to a beneficial use has the prior right. It is his
right to have that amount of water come down to him and his privilege to take it
regardless of the effect on others. Subsequent appropriators have similar rights but
subject to prior appropriators. See I WrnL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES,
3d ed., 287-340 (19u).
2 The case was twice before the Supreme Court of Colorado. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 25 P. (2d) 187 (1933);
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 101 Colo. 73, 70 P. (2d)
849 (1937). An appeal to the Supreme Court from the first decision was dismissed for
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appeal should be dismissed; but the decision was reviewed on certiorari and
reversed. The Court stated that the La Plata River compact concluded plaintiff's rights. Hinderlider v. La Plata R. & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 58 S. Ct. 803 ( 1938), rehearing denied 6 U. S. L. WEEK 145 (Oct. I 1,
1938).
By its qualified prohibition of compacts and agreements between the states,
the Federal Constitution impliedly recognizes the power to make them. 8 And the
trend toward dealing with social problems through legislation has brought
increasing reliance upon this device for cooperation between the states. 4 The
principal case raises two questions of importance to the efficacy of such compacts: How far are they subject to state and national constitutional limitations?
Can their construction and application be made uniform by enforcement in the
federal courts? A compact, when assented to by Congress,5 is superior to later
inconsistent legislation of any party. 6 Its supremacy has been explained in at least
three ways. Congress' assent has been said to make it a law of the United
States; 7 it is clearly protected by article I, section 10 of the Constitution, prohibiting impairment of the obligation of contracts; 8 and the rule has been said
to be merely the result of applying a principle of international law.9 The first
of these theories is apparently erroneous. For the requirement of Congressional
assent is not a grant of legislative power to Congress but a limitation on an
inherent power of the states.10 This interpretation is particularly emphasized
by the doctrine that not all compacts need Congressional ratification.11 It seems,
want of final judgment. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
291 U.S. 650, 54 S. Ct. 557 (1934).
8 "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...." U. S. Constitution, art. I, § 10, clause 3.
4 See Frankfurter and Landis, "The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments," 34 YALE L. J. 685 (1925); Clark, "Interstate·
Compacts and Social Legislation," 50 PoL. Sci. Q. 502 (1.935), 51 ibid. 36 (1936);
Dodd, "Interstate Compacts," 70 U. S. L. REV. 557 (1936). Cf. Corwin, "NationalState Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities," 46 YALE L. J. 599 (1937), citing Bunn,
"Production, Prices, Incomes and the Constitution," II Wis. L. REv. 313 at 320
(1936).
5 The belief that some agreements may be valid without assent of Congress has
been prevalent. See I WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed., § 172 (1929).
Cf. 45 YALE L. J. 324 at 328 (1935); 35 CoL. L. REv. 76 at 77-79 (1935). See
also Weinfeld, "What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by 'Agreements or Compacts'?" 3 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 453 (1936).
6 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) I (1823); see 45 YALE L. J. 324 at 329
(1935); 35 Cot. L. REV. 76 at 80-84 (1935).
7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (54 U. S.) 518 at 566
{1851).
.
8 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (21 U. S.) I at 91 {1823); Kentucky Union Co.
v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140 at 162, 31 S. Ct. 171 {19u). Cf. 45 YALE L. J. 324
at 329 (1935); 35 CoL. L. REV. 76 at 80-84 (1935).
9 45 YALE L. J. 324 at 329 (1935); 35 Cot. L. REv. 76 at 77, So (1935).
10 See 35 Cot. L. REv. 76 at 76, So (1935).
11 See note 5, supra.
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then, that interstate compacts are essentially legislative acts of the signatory
states and should be subject to the ordinary constitutional restraints placed upon
such legislation.12 The compact in the principal case was attacked as violative of
due process. But regardless whether the compact was a valid exercise of the
police power, a doctrine has been established which can be applied to sustain
such a compact. In boundary disputes between states a compromise compact is
held to establish the true line ab initio, and grants from a state which had no
title are obviously ineffective.13 So here, since the theory of appropriation rights
is that they are grants from the state,14 they may be cut down by an interstate
compact which is in settlement of disputed claims to water.15 In the absence of
agreement, interstate waters are to be shared "equitably.>' 16 A distribution may
be effected through suit by a state in the Supreme Court.17 And the basis of
distribution is a survey of all the social and economic needs of the claimant
states.18 An extreme latitude is thus allowed the states in reaching terms of a
If, on the contrary, the clause were considered an affirmative grant of power
to Congress (or to the states), there would be ground for contending that due process
in its substantive aspect would not be violated by any action under the clause. See
2 WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed.,§ 781 (1929).
18
Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 8 S. Ct. I (1887).
14
See Colo. Const. (1876), art. 16, §§ 5, 6.
15
The majority opinions of the Colorado court in the principal case, 93 Colo.
128, 25 P. (2d) 187 (1933); 101 Colo. 73, 70 P. (2d) 849 (1937), exhibit the
difficulty in treating as analogous to a boundary settlement a compact which requires
continuous administration in the future and is made expressly amendable to fit changing conditions. But a suit in the Supreme Court to settle the legal rights of the party
states would probably end in a decree just as complex. See Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U. S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 552 (1922); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336,
51 S. Ct. 478 (1931). Thus it seems that in the field of interstate water rights a settlement of disputed claims must inevitably be in the form of an executory decree or
agreement.
16
Between private parties, rights in interstate waters have been treated as arising
independent of state lines; i.e., an appropriation in state A is subject to a prior
appropriation in state B although the stream flows from A to B and A has the power
to prevent any water from reaching B. Howell v. Johnson, (C. C. Mont. 1898) 89 F.
556. But this rule is probably only one of construction of state law; and A may use
all the water except as decreed otherwise by the Supreme Court in a suit between the
states. Holmes, J., in Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 31 S. Ct. 703 (1911).
17
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 552 (1922); New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336, 51 S. Ct. 478 (1931).
18
See Kansasv. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 at 106, 27 S. Ct. 655 (1907); Wyoming
v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 552 (1922); New Jersey v. New York, 283
U. S. 336, 51 S. Ct. 478 (1931); Bannister, "Interstate Rights in Interstate Streams
in the Arid West," 36 HARv. L. REv. 960 at 975 (1923). The opinion of Justice
Holmes in New Jersey v. New York has made it reasonably clear that the Court has
not yet found any definite rules of decision to which it is willing to adhere. Each case
will be considered independently. See Bannister, op. cit., at 977; Niles, "Legal Background of the Colorado River Controversy," I RocKY MT. L. REv. 73 (1929); Carman, "ls There a New Era in the Law of Interstate Waters," 5 So. CAL. L. REV. 25
(1931).
12
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"compromise." For the purpose of review of decisions of state courts in the
Supreme Court, it has been held that an interstate compact is not a federal
statute or treaty.19 This position is admitted in the principal case, and the appeal
was dismissed for that reason. But review as upon certiorari was allowed because the Colorado court had denied "an important claim under the Constitution." 20 If it is assumed that the compact clause of the Constitution is no
more than ~ limited prohibition, it is difficult to see how any constitutional
right can be claimed to have been granted by it. Another suggested source of
constitutional right is the "federal common law" of interstate waters. 21 As
here used, the term applies only to that body of case law built up by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over controversies between
states. 22 It seems at least doubtful whether it should be said that the Colorado
court denied a claim under the Constitution when it decided a suit between
private parties in a manner inconsistent with a rule established by the Supreme
Court for suits between states. There may have been a violation of federal law,
but that law was not the Constitution nor a federal statute. The Supreme Court
has apparently opened the way for construction and application of interstate
compacts by certiorari to state courts. While this procedure is recognized as
desirable,2 3 it is difficult to justify under the present Judiciary Act.
Gerald M. Stevens

19 People v. Central R. R., 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 455 (1870). In Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling, etc. Bridge Co., 13 How. (54 U. S.) 518 at 566 (1851), it was said,
"This compact, by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the Union. What
further legislation can be desired for judicial action?" On the jurisdictional question
this statement is pure dictum, for the Supreme Court had the case by virtue of its
original jurisdiction. And on the question of supremacy of a compact over inconsistent
legislation the statement is apparently based on Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (21 U. S.)
I (1823), where superiority was said to be due to the contracts clause of the federal
Constitution. The dictum of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co. is relied on as
authority for the jurisdictional question in Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 at 581,
24 S. Ct. 322 (1904).
20 Principal case, 304 U. S. at I IO. See 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 344·
21 See citations at note I 8, supra.
22 See 21 HARV. L. REv. 132 (1907) on interstate common law. Compare the
statement in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), that there
is no general federal common law. The opinion there as well as in the principal case is by
Justice Brandeis. Both were handed down on the same day.
28 45 YALE L. J. 324 at 328, note 22 (1935).

